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Modeling classical swine Fever 
Outbreak-related Outcomes
Shankar Yadav1 , Nicole J. Olynk Widmar2 and Hsin-Yi Weng1*
1 Department of Comparative Pathobiology, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA, 2 Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
The study was carried out to estimate classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak-related 
outcomes, such as epidemic duration and number of infected, vaccinated, and depop-
ulated premises, using defined most likely CSF outbreak scenarios. Risk metrics were 
established using empirical data to select the most likely CSF outbreak scenarios in 
Indiana. These scenarios were simulated using a stochastic between-premises disease 
spread model to estimate outbreak-related outcomes. A total of 19 single-site (i.e., with 
one index premises at the onset of an outbreak) and 15 multiple-site (i.e., with more 
than one index premises at the onset of an outbreak) outbreak scenarios of CSF were 
selected using the risk metrics. The number of index premises in the multiple-site out-
break scenarios ranged from 4 to 32. The multiple-site outbreak scenarios were further 
classified into clustered (N = 6) and non-clustered (N = 9) groups. The estimated median 
(5th, 95th percentiles) epidemic duration (days) was 224 (24, 343) in the single-site and 
was 190 (157, 251) and 210 (167, 302) in the clustered and non-clustered multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios, respectively. The median (5th, 95th percentiles) number of infected 
premises was 323 (0, 488) in the single-site outbreak scenarios and was 529 (395, 662) 
and 465 (295, 640) in the clustered and non-clustered multiple-site outbreak scenarios, 
respectively. Both the number and spatial distributions of the index premises affected 
the outcome estimates. The results also showed the importance of implementing 
vaccinations to accommodate depopulation in the CSF outbreak controls. The use of 
routinely collected surveillance data in the risk metrics and disease spread model allows 
end users to generate timely outbreak-related information based on the initial outbreak’s 
characteristics. Swine producers can use this information to make an informed decision 
on the management of swine operations and continuity of business, so that potential 
losses could be minimized during a CSF outbreak. Government authorities might use the 
information to make emergency preparedness plans for CSF outbreak control.
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inTrODUcTiOn
Classical swine fever (CSF) is a highly contagious viral disease found in domestic and wild pigs. Due 
to its severe economic and animal welfare consequences, CSF is classified as a reportable disease by 
the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). From 1997 to 1998, several European countries 
experienced CSF outbreaks (1). In the Netherlands, outbreaks continued for 401 days, and more 
TaBle 1 | summary of county- and premises-level attributes used for the 
selection of the most likely classical swine fever outbreak scenarios in 
indiana, United states.
attribute county level Premises level
Median (5th, 95th percentiles)
Import frequency 15 (1, 122) 2 (1, 17)
International import 
frequency
8 (1, 33) 1 (1, 5)
Number of imported pigs 10,735 (2, 127,992) 750 (1, 19,960)
Number of import origins 6 (1, 30) 1 (1, 5)
Number of swine premises 91 (22, 238)
Type of swine premises
 IDEM 9 (1, 56)
 NP 82 (20, 183)
 Exhibition 1 (1, 1)
Operation types
 Nursery, nursery-to-finish 2 (1, 16)
 Finish 4 (1, 27)
 Farrow-to-finish 4 (1, 19)
Immigrant population 749 (101, 18,163)
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than 11 million pigs were killed (2). The total economic losses in 
the Netherlands due to the outbreaks were estimated to be $2.3 
billion (3), and 50% of the losses were attributed to the “welfare 
slaughter” of pigs (4). The term welfare slaughter is defined as the 
mass depopulation of healthy pigs due to the emergence of animal 
welfare concerns on swine premises (5). During the 1997–1998 
CSF outbreaks in Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany, the 
welfare slaughter proportions were 87, 64, and 60%, respectively 
(1, 2).
Although CSF was eradicated from the United States in 1978, 
it is one of the most important foreign animal diseases (FADs) 
along with foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (6). Currently, many Asian, Latin American, and 
European countries are CSF-endemic regions (7). International 
trade, pork smuggling, and immigrant farm workers entering 
from endemic regions could be potential risks for CSF introduc-
tion in the United States (8). The over four million feral pigs that 
live in 39 states of the United States also pose a potential threat 
for CSF spread (9, 10). These feral pigs might serve as a means 
to spread CSF if they were accidentally infected by consuming 
contaminated feed or from contact with infected pigs from neigh-
boring CSF-endemic countries.
A potential CSF outbreak would lead to an immediate interna-
tional trade ban on pork and pork products that would last for at 
least 3 months in the affected areas (11). The United States swine 
industry, one of the world’s top pork exporters, might face huge 
economic consequences due to trade ban. In 2014, the United 
States swine industry was worth an estimated $6.67 billion in the 
export market (12), which might be seriously affected by a CSF 
outbreak. However, the actual economic impacts of CSF on the 
United States swine industry will be dependent upon temporal 
and spatial patterns as well as the extent of an outbreak. Because 
CSF is not present in the United States, epidemiological modeling 
and simulation studies can be applied to estimate the patterns and 
magnitude of a potential outbreak.
The published simulation studies on the spread of CSF were 
based on swine production in Belgium (13), Germany (14), the 
Netherlands (15), Denmark (16), and Spain (17). The modeling 
approaches and strategies used across these studies were similar 
in that the simulations of disease outbreaks were initiated from 
single swine premises. In reality, CSF outbreaks might occur 
at several locations simultaneously because of swine opera-
tions sharing the same import origins. These outbreaks would 
have different epidemiological, economic, and animal welfare 
consequences than previously reported. Furthermore, the epi-
demiological estimates derived from these models cannot be 
directly extrapolated to the United States due to differences in 
the European swine production system, potential initial outbreak 
characteristics, and control strategies. Therefore, we investigated 
the likely patterns of a CSF outbreak while considering the swine 
production system, the movement of pigs, and other attributes of 
CSF introduction in Indiana in the United States. The goal of this 
study was to provide a decision tool to the end users that could 
be easily updated with routinely collected data to generate timely 
evidence-based outbreak outcome estimates. The objective of 
this study was to estimate CSF outbreak-related outcomes, such 
as epidemic duration and number of infected, vaccinated, and 
depopulated premises, from the defined most likely CSF outbreak 
scenarios by using the swine premises data of Indiana.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
The study was conducted in two steps: (1) selecting the most 
likely CSF outbreak scenarios in Indiana and (2) simulating the 
selected CSF outbreak scenarios to estimate outbreak outcomes.
selecting the Most likely csF Outbreak 
scenarios in indiana
Both county- and premises-level risk metrics for defining CSF 
introduction scenarios in Indiana were established. The attrib-
utes that were associated with CSF introduction according to 
published literature were identified from different data sources, 
including the 2012 Indiana State Swine Premise Identification 
Database (USAHERDS), United States Census data, and the 2013 
Indiana State Natural Resources Data (Table  1). USAHERDS 
included information on individual swine premises and their live 
pig import and export activities. Import data included shipments 
of live pigs coming into Indiana from other states of the United 
States or abroad, while the export data included the shipments of 
live pigs leaving Indiana. All of the import and export activities 
were listed with the date of veterinary inspection, shipment size, 
geolocations (latitude and longitude) of import origin, receiving 
swine premises, and shipment date. As the movement of pigs is 
well recognized as a potential risk for CSF introduction in a CSF-
free area (8, 18), several import activity-related attributes were 
included in the risk metrics.
All of the swine premises in Indiana were identified by a unique 
swine premises identification number, geolocation (latitude and 
longitude), herd size, and operation type. These characteristics of 
swine premises were important determinants for CSF introduc-
tion. For example, nursery operations have frequent movement of 
pigs, people, and vehicles due to a shorter operation cycle, which 
might put them at higher risk for CSF introduction than other 
TaBle 2 | The scoring system for the county-level risk metrics for 
selecting the most likely classical swine fever outbreak scenarios in 
indiana, United states.
attribute Weight 
range
category Weight
Import frequency 0–5 No import 0
≤20th percentile 1
20th to 40th 
percentile
2
40th to 60th 
percentile
3
60th to 80 
percentile
4
>80th percentile 5
International import frequency 0–5 No import 0
≤20th percentile 1
20th to 40th 
percentile
2
40th to 60th 
percentile
3
60th to 80th 
percentile
4
>80th 5
Number of imported pigs 0–3 No import 0
≤50,000 1
50,001–100,000 2
>100,000 3
Number of import origins 0–3 No import 0
≤50th percentile 1
50th to 75th 
percentile
2
>75th percentile 3
Number of swine premises 0–5 No premises 0
≤20th percentile 1
20th to 40th 
percentile
2
40th to 60th 
percentile
3
60th to 80th 
percentile
4
>80th percentile 5
Number of non-permitted swine 
premises
0–5 No premises 0
≤20th percentile 1
20th to 40th 
percentile
2
40th to 60th 
percentile
3
60th to 80th 
percentile
4
>80th percentile 5
Exhibition swine premises 0 or 2 Absence 0
Presence 2
Number of nursery and  
nursery-to-finish premises
0–2 Absence 0
≤15 1
>15 2
Immigrant population index 0–2 ≤2 0
2–7 1
>7 2
Feral hogs 0 or 3 Absence 0
Presence 3
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swine operations. Furthermore, the aggregation of pigs from dif-
ferent swine premises during an exhibition event might increase 
the risk for CSF introduction and spread and was included in the 
risk metrics as an attribute (19, 20).
There are two types of premises listed in USAHERDS: prem-
ises permitted by the Indiana State Department of Environmental 
Management (IDEM) and non-permitted (NP) premises. In 
Indiana, it is mandatory to receive permission from IDEM to run 
swine operation if the herd size is ≥700. Unlike IDEM premises, 
the NP premises are not subject to mandatory government 
inspection. Therefore, permit type (i.e., IDEM/NP) was included 
as a metric attribute for CSF introduction (21).
The 2012 immigrant population and total population of 
Indiana by county (N = 92) were extracted from the American 
Community Survey Data website (http://factfinder2.census.
gov/). Immigrant swine farm workers from CSF-endemic 
countries might be an important risk for CSF introduction in 
the United States (21). Because the exact statistics on immigrant 
workers were not available at county level, an index variable was 
computed using Eq. 1.
 
Immigrant index for county 
Immigrant population Total 
j
j= ( / population
Total swine premises
j
j
)
×  (1)
The Indiana State Natural Resources Data included the spatial 
distribution of Indiana’s feral pig population. Feral hogs are one 
of the reported sources for CSF outbreaks in Germany (10). 
In the United States, feral hogs are present in at least 39 states 
(including Indiana) with an estimated population size of more 
than four million (9). CSF might be introduced in a naive feral pig 
population through contaminated food scraps or other unknown 
sources, which might spread the disease into Indiana. The data 
on Indiana’s feral hog population distribution were routinely col-
lected and were included as an attribute in the risk metric.
These data were analyzed, and the distribution of each metric 
attribute was examined to determine the cutoff values for catego-
rization by nature gaps in the data or percentiles. Corresponding 
weights were assigned based on the importance of the attributes 
to CSF introduction with a larger weight representing a higher 
risk. The county-level risk metric (Table  2) was used to score 
each of the Indiana’s counties based on the data for their risk of 
CSF introduction. The counties were then ranked by the summed 
score across all the metric attributes. The top 10 counties with the 
highest scores were identified and divided into 2 groups: top 1–5 
and top 6–10. Using a similar algorithm, the swine premises in 
the top 1–5 and top 6–10 counties were ranked separately based 
on the premises-level metrics (Table 3). The top-ranked swine 
premises with the highest weights were selected.
After selecting the swine premises with the highest risk of CSF 
introduction using the risk metrics, the next step was to define 
the most likely CSF outbreak scenarios in Indiana. Two types 
of CSF outbreak scenarios were considered: single and multiple 
sites. These two types of CSF outbreak scenarios were different 
in the number of index premises (i.e., initially infected prem-
ises) at the onset of an outbreak. Only one index premises was 
present in a single-site outbreak scenario, while more than one 
index premises were simultaneously present in a multiple-site 
outbreak scenario. Each swine premises selected from the risk 
metrics represented the location of index premises for a single-
site outbreak scenario. Next, the index premises’ import origin 
TaBle 3 | The scoring system for the premises-level risk metrics for 
selecting the most likely classical swine fever outbreak scenarios in 
indiana, United states.
attribute Weight 
range
category Weight
Import frequency 0–5 No import 0
≤25th percentile 1
25th to 75th percentile 3
>75th percentile 5
International import 
frequency
0–2 No import 0
≤4 1
>4 2
Number of imported pigs 0–3 No import 0
≤25th percentile 1
25th to 75th percentile 2
>75th percentile 3
Number of import origins 0–5 No import 0
≤4 2
>4 5
Type of swine premises 0 or 3 IDEM 0
NP 3
Operation types 0 or 2 Finish, farrow-to-finish 0
Nursery, 
nursery-to-finish
2
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for each single-site outbreak scenario was reviewed to identify 
other swine premises in Indiana that imported live pigs from 
the same source premises. These secondarily identified premises 
and the originally selected index premises for the single-site 
outbreak scenarios together comprised a multiple-site outbreak 
scenario. The process was repeated for each premises selected 
from the risk metrics to define different multiple-site outbreak 
scenarios.
USAHERDS was used to map the distribution of index prem-
ises and control zones for the selected single-site and multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios using ArcGIS (version 10.3, ESRI, Redlands, 
CA, USA). The CSF control zones were plotted for each swine 
premises using the geoprocessing tools of ArcGIS according to 
the USDA CSF response plan (6). An infected zone with a 3-km 
radius and a movement restriction zone (also called buffer zone) 
that was 7  km away from the infected zone’s perimeter were 
plotted. The qualitative (i.e., the mapping of index premises) and 
quantitative (i.e., the number of premises in control zones) data 
were extracted for all index premises. Furthermore, the spatial 
distribution of index premises was used to classify the selected 
multiple-site outbreak scenarios into clustered and non-clustered 
groups. The classification was based on the number of index 
premises and the distance among them. To be classified as a clus-
tered scenario, a scenario must have more than 10 index premises, 
and the majority of index premises were within 20 km from each 
other. Therefore, if two control zones (each with a 10-km radius) 
overlapped, it indicates that the two index premises were located 
within 20 km from one another.
Sensitivity analyses for the risk metrics were performed on 
the operation type, number of pigs imported (county level) and 
international import frequency, and the number of import ori-
gins (premises level). These attributes were selected for sensitivity 
analysis because there were no obvious breaking points in the 
data to define low versus high risk. Different cutoff values were 
used to evaluate their impacts on the risk metrics. An attribute 
was considered to be sensitive if the change in its cutoff values 
resulted in retaining <70% of the same selection of the top-ranked 
counties and swine premises.
simulation of the csF spread
North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) 
software PC version 4.0.13 (22) was used to simulate the selected 
CSF outbreak scenarios. NAADSM is a stochastic, temporal, 
and spatial state transition disease spread model. All Indiana 
swine premises registered in USAHERDS were included in the 
model simulations. It was assumed that a swine premises was 
infected if any pigs on the premises were infected. The simula-
tions started with the index premises for each of the selected CSF 
outbreak scenarios (labeled as the infected) on day 0, whereas 
the rest premises were labeled as susceptible. Each of the selected 
single-site and multiple-site outbreak scenarios were simulated 
separately for 500 iterations. The model input parameters are 
listed in Table 4.
Simulations were run at the level of swine premises with a time 
step of 1 day. Three modes of CSF transmission (direct contact, 
indirect contact, and local spread) were used to model disease 
spread. Direct contact was defined as the spread of CSF from an 
infected premises to a susceptible premises through the ship-
ment of pigs, whereas indirect contact was through movement of 
vehicles, people, and equipment. A local spread was defined as the 
spread of CSF from an infected premises to a susceptible prem-
ises within a 1-km radius by unknown mechanisms; possibly by 
insects or reptiles (22, 28, 31). For direct and indirect contact, 
probability distributions were assigned for three parameters: 
contact rate, probability of infection transfer due to a contact, 
and distance distribution of recipient premises. Estimates for 
direct and indirect contact rates were obtained from published 
studies (14, 17, 25). The probability of infection transfer due to 
a direct or an indirect contact was adopted from the estimate 
derived from the 1997–1998 CSF outbreaks in the Netherlands 
(27). In NAADSM, the distance matrix among swine premises 
was computed using their geolocations. During a simulation, the 
model algorithm selected recipient susceptible swine premises 
for a direct or indirect contact based on their distance from an 
infected premises. The closer susceptible swine premises had 
a higher probability of being infected than premises that were 
further away. The probability of disease transfer by local spread 
also gradually decreased with an increase in the distance from an 
infected premises (22, 31). Details on the three modes of disease 
transmission implemented in NAADSM can be found in Table 4 
and other references (25, 28, 31).
Different outbreak control measures were allowed in 
NAADSM. The implementation of movement restriction, vac-
cination, and the depopulation of infected and vaccinated prem-
ises in the model was based on the CSF control strategies of the 
United States (6, 25). Due to the effects of movement restriction, 
the direct contact and indirect contact rates were reduced to 15 
and 30% of their baseline by the seventh day, respectively. These 
reductions stayed constant by the 30th day in single-site outbreak 
scenarios. The reductions of contact rates reflect the compliance 
rate of movement restriction. For example, a reduction of 15% 
TaBle 4 | Premises-level model input parameters and the probability 
distributions used for the simulation of classical swine fever spread in 
indiana, United states.
Parameters Probability 
distribution
reference
Disease ParaMeTers
Latent period (days) Poisson (4) (23)
Infectious sub-clinical period (days) Poisson (6) (24)
Infectious clinical period (days) Poisson (21) (17)
DirecT cOnTacT sPreaD
Mean baseline direct contact rate (recipient 
units/day)
0.186 (25, 26)
Probability of infection transfer 0.277 (27)
Distance distribution of recipient units (km) Triangle  
(1, 60, 120)
Empirical data
inDirecT cOnTacT sPreaD
Mean baseline indirect contact rate 
(recipient units/day)
0.3 (14)
Probability of infection transfer 0.048 (27)
Distance distribution of recipient units (km) Triangle  
(1, 60, 120)
Empirical data
lOcal sPreaD
Distance between two premises (km) 1 (28)
Daily probability of local areas spread of 
CSF between two premises
0.00001 (29)
cOnTrOl ZOnes
Movement restriction zone radius (km) 7 (6)
Infected zone radius (km) 3 (6)
DePOPUlaTiOn FOr csF cOnTrOl
Delay before implementing depopulation 
program (days)
2 (25)
Depopulation ring radius (km) 3 (6)
VaccinaTiOn
Number of infected units to be investigated 
before vaccinations
5 (25)
Vaccination immune period (days) Triangle  
(150, 240, 365)
(30)
Delay in immunity (days) 7 (30)
Radius of vaccination ring (km) 3 (6)
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corresponds to a compliance rate of movement restriction of 
85%. The compliance rate of movement restriction was obtained 
from published studies (23, 32). Compliances with movement 
restriction were assumed to be lower in multiple-site outbreak 
scenarios due to potential illegal movements in the wider geo-
graphical areas. Therefore, the direct and indirect contact rates 
were assumed to be reduced to 25 and 50% of their baseline at the 
60th day onward in multiple-site outbreak scenarios. Movement 
restriction does not affect local spread of CSF in NAADSM. 
Vaccination (live attenuated) was implemented in the model 
for all swine premises in the infected zone (a 3-km radius of 
the infected premises) so that disease spread could be reduced, 
and depopulation capacity could be accommodated (6, 33, 34). 
All the infected and vaccinated swine premises were set to be 
depopulated during the CSF control. The depopulation capacity 
was modeled to gradually increase from 0 to 10 premises/day by 
the 7th day and 15 premises/day by the 15th day onward (25). The 
detailed algorithms of NAADSM can be found elsewhere (22, 31).
The major outcomes of the study were the median (5th, 95th 
percentiles) epidemic duration and the number of premises being 
infected, depopulated, and vaccinated. All iteration results were 
combined across the outbreak scenarios within single-site and 
multiple-site outbreaks when computing the outputs.
The direct and indirect contact rates and probability of infection 
transfer due to contact were chosen for the sensitivity analyses of 
the CSF spread model due to their inconsistent use in published 
studies (14, 16, 17, 35). A 25% change in the values of selected 
input parameters was used in the analyses to evaluate their effects 
on the estimates of epidemic duration and the number of infected 
premises. A parameter was considered sensitive if the 25% change 
in its values led to a change in the median epidemic duration 
by 10  days and a median percent of infected premises by 15% 
from their baseline estimates. The selection of thresholds for the 
sensitivity analysis was subjective. However, similar thresholds 
were used for sensitivity analyses in other simulation studies 
using NAADSM (25).
resUlTs
There were 8,631 (IDEM: 1,381, NP: 7,250) swine premises, 38 
exhibition swine premises, 11 dealers, and 44 pig collection points 
registered in 2012 in Indiana. In total, 3,145 import shipments of 
live pigs were completed. A total of 365 swine premises outside of 
Indiana sent shipments of pigs to 765 swine premises in Indiana. 
The median numbers of pigs imported into Indiana in 2012 were 
1,000 at the premises level and 10,571 at the county level. The 
import shipment size ranged from 1 to 11,175 (median: 1,000).
The Most likely csF Outbreak scenarios
Nineteen single-site and 15 multiple-site CSF outbreak scenarios 
were selected using the risk metrics. The number of index prem-
ises in the multiple-site outbreak scenarios ranged from 4 to 32. 
None of the selected attributes in the risk metrics were sensitive as 
more than 70% of the 10 top-ranked counties and swine premises 
remained in the sensitivity analyses.
Control zones were mapped for each of the 254 index premises 
in the selected outbreak scenarios. The spatial distribution of the 
index premises of multiple-site outbreaks and their control zones 
are present in Figure  1. For confidentiality, the distribution of 
single-site outbreak scenarios is not present. Among the mul-
tiple-site outbreak scenarios, six scenarios (MO1, MO2, MO4, 
MO5, MO6, and MO7, where “MO” represents the multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios, and the digit represents their ranking) were 
classified as clustered, while the rest were classified as non-clus-
tered based on the criteria previously described (Figure 1). The 
number of index premises in the clustered scenarios ranged from 
19 to 32, and ranged from 4 to 19 in the non-clustered scenarios. 
The median (5th, 95th percentiles) number of swine premises in 
the infected zones in the single-site and multiple-site outbreak 
scenarios was 6 (1, 10) and 64 (40, 90), respectively. The median 
(5th, 95th percentiles) number of swine premises in the move-
ment restriction zones was 90 (28, 170) and 570 (150, 770) for 
the single-site and multiple-site outbreak scenarios, respectively.
csF spread Outcomes
We initially estimated the outcomes separately for each of the 
19 single-site and 15 multiple-site outbreak scenarios (data not 
FigUre 1 | The distribution of index swine premises and the outbreak control zones for the 15 most likely multiple-site classical swine fever 
outbreak scenarios (MO1 to MO15). The dots are the swine premises and the circles are the control zones.
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TaBle 5 | The median (5th, 95th percentiles) number of infected, 
vaccinated, and depopulated swine premises in the 19 most likely single-
site classical swine fever outbreak scenarios (N = 9,500 iterations) and 6 
clustered (N = 3,000 iterations) and 9 non-clustered (N = 4,500 iterations) 
multiple-site outbreak scenarios.
Outcome single-site 
outbreak
Multiple-site outbreak
clustered non-clustered 
Infected 
premises
323 (0, 488) 529  
(395, 662)
465  
(295, 640)
Vaccinated 
premises
405 (0, 1,621) 2,131  
(1,526, 2,556)
1,655  
(360, 5,475)
Depopulated 
premises
1,526 (5, 2,198) 2,659  
(1,927, 3,211)
1,987  
(657, 2,925)
FigUre 3 | epidemic curves for (a) 19 most likely single-site classical 
swine fever outbreak scenarios (N = 9,500 iterations). (B) 15 most 
likely multiple-site outbreak scenarios (N = 7,500 iterations).
FigUre 2 | histograms of the epidemic duration estimates for (a) 19 
most likely single-site classical swine fever outbreak scenarios 
(N = 9,500 iterations). (B) 15 most likely multiple-site outbreak 
scenarios (N = 7,500 iterations).
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shown). The results from the single-site outbreak scenario simu-
lations were similar, whereas the results from the multiple-site 
outbreak scenario simulations varied based on the spatial pat-
terns of the index premises (i.e., clustered versus non-clustered). 
Overall, we found that the local spread (58%) contributed the 
highest proportions of CSF transmission followed by direct 
(33%) and indirect (8%) contact. The estimated median (5th, 
95th percentiles) epidemic duration (days) was 224 (24, 343) 
in the single-site and 201 (161, 285) in the multiple-site out-
break scenarios (Figures  2A,B). The median number of days 
to peak epidemic was 97 with the number of newly infected 
premises of 3.1 at the peak in the single-site outbreak scenarios 
(Figure  3A). The median number of days to peak epidemic 
was 40 with the number of newly infected premises of 6.8 at 
the peak in the multiple-site outbreak scenarios (Figure  3B). 
Among the multiple-site outbreak scenarios, the median (5th, 
95th percentiles) epidemic duration was 190 (157, 251) in the 
clustered scenarios (estimated from 3,000 iterations) and 210 
(167, 302) in the non-clustered scenarios (estimated from 4,500 
iterations). A shorter time to peak epidemic (46 versus 33 days) 
and a larger number of newly infected premises at the peak (7.9 
versus 5.2) was found in the clustered scenarios compared to the 
non-clustered scenarios.
The median (5th, 95th percentiles) numbers of infected, 
vaccinated, and depopulated premises in the single-site and 
multiple-site outbreaks are present in Table 5. The distribution 
of number of infected premises is also present in the histograms 
(Figures  4A,B). Based on our models, vaccinations could be 
completed within 2 days in both the single-site and multiple-site 
scenarios. However, mass depopulations took several days to 
complete. The median number of days (5th, 95th percentiles) for 
premises to be in a queue for mass depopulation was 3 (1, 16) in 
the single-site and 23 (2, 44) in the multiple-site outbreak sce-
narios. The median number of days for premises to be in a queue 
for mass depopulation was longer in the clustered scenarios than 
in the non-clustered scenarios (31 versus 14 days).
The indirect contact rate and probability of infection trans-
fer due to indirect contact were not sensitive in any of the sce-
narios. The epidemic duration estimates for the multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios were not affected by changes in the values 
of selected input parameters. However, epidemic duration esti-
mates for the single-site outbreak scenarios were significantly 
reduced due to a 25% reduction in the direct contact rate and 
the probability of infection transfer due to direct contact. A 
25% change in these input parameters also led to a significant 
FigUre 4 | histograms of the number of infected premises estimates 
for (a) 19 most likely single-site classical swine fever outbreak 
scenarios (N = 9,500 iterations). (B) 15 most likely multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios (N = 7,500 iterations).
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change in the estimates of the number of infected premises in 
both single-site and multiple-site outbreak scenarios.
DiscUssiOn
In this study, risk metrics were developed to select the most likely 
CSF outbreak scenarios for simulations using a disease spread 
model to estimate the magnitude and patterns of CSF outbreaks in 
Indiana in the United States, respectively. The goal of this study was 
to provide end users with an empirically supported decision tool 
that could be easily updated with routinely collected data to generate 
timely evidence-based estimates of CSF outbreak-related outcomes.
In the risk metrics for selecting the most likely CSF outbreak sce-
narios in Indiana, attributes for CSF introduction were identified, 
and a scoring system was developed based on the best available evi-
dence compiled from empirical data, research literature, and expert 
opinion. A similar data collection approach was also used to obtain 
the data for the input parameters necessary to simulate CSF disease 
spread using NAADSM. The developed models and documented 
information would serve as a platform to assist in generating timely 
CSF outbreak-related outcomes at the onset of an outbreak.
Differences in the outbreak-related outcomes are evident in 
the historical CSF outbreaks. For example, the epidemic durations 
of the 1997–1998 CSF outbreaks in Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Spain were 123, 401, and 417  days, respectively (1). These 
differences might be attributed to the differences in the swine 
production system, the number of index premises at the onset of 
an outbreak and their spatial distribution, and the outbreak control 
strategies in the three countries. In this study, we defined differ-
ent most likely CSF outbreak patterns (e.g., single-site, clustered 
multiple-site, and non-clustered multiple-site outbreaks) using risk 
metrics and investigated their effects on outbreak-related outcome 
estimates. The median epidemic duration estimates were longer for 
the single-site outbreak scenarios compared to the multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios (Figures 2A,B). However, a bimodal distribu-
tion was observed in the simulations of the single-site outbreak 
scenarios (Figure 2A). Out of the 9,500 iterations simulated in the 
single-site outbreak scenarios, 18% did not initiate an epidemic 
(Figure  4A) and 30% of iterations had epidemic durations of 
<100 days (Figure 2A). By contrast, all simulated iterations (7,500) 
in the multiple-site outbreaks resulted in an epidemic (Figure 4B), 
and only 0.15% of iterations had epidemic durations of <100 days 
(Figure 2B). The number of daily newly infected premises peaked 
at 3.1 in the single-site outbreak scenarios compared to a peak 
at 6.8 in the multiple-site outbreak scenarios (Figures  3A,B). A 
high number of daily newly infected premises in the multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios might have led to an insufficient number of sus-
ceptible premises in the population for the epidemic to continue, 
which resulted in an approximately 195-day mode of epidemic 
duration compared to the second mode that occurred at approxi-
mately 240 days in the single-site outbreaks (Figures 2A,B). These 
differences in the epidemic patterns between the single-site and 
multiple-site outbreak scenarios might explain the observation of a 
greater variation in the estimates of epidemic duration in the single-
site outbreaks (i.e., a wider 5th and 95th percentile interval). Our 
estimates of the time to peak epidemic (97 days) and the number 
of peak daily infected premises (3.1) for the single-site outbreak 
scenarios were similar to the figures (98 days and 3.5, respectively) 
reported in the 1997–1998 CSF outbreaks in the Netherlands (32).
Our inclusion of the multiple-site outbreak scenarios allowed 
us to evaluate the impacts of the number of index premises (a 
range from 4 to 34) and their spatial distributions (clustered 
versus non-clustered) on the estimates of epidemic duration. 
The epidemics initiated with clustered index premises and with 
more index premises resulted in relatively shorter epidemic 
durations. For example, the estimated median epidemic duration 
was 174 in MO1 (the number of index premises was 32) and 253 
in MO15 (the number of index premises was 4). Furthermore, 
for MO6 (clustered) and MO3 (non-clustered), which had the 
same number of index premises, the estimated median epidemic 
duration was 195 and 216, respectively. This observation provides 
further support to the previous hypothesis that a high number 
of index premises and clustered index premises might lead to an 
insufficient number of susceptible premises in the population for 
an epidemic to continue, resulting in a shorter epidemic duration.
Our approach differs from other similar modeling studies of 
the spread of CSF, which include only one single-site outbreak 
scenario (14, 16, 17, 36). The median epidemic durations esti-
mated for single-site outbreak scenarios in this study were longer 
than that of an estimate in Spain (63 days) but were comparable to 
the estimates in Germany (200 days) and within the range of esti-
mates in the Netherlands (100–373 days) (14, 17, 27). However, 
our results showed a bimodal distribution of the estimated 
epidemic durations, which indicated that using the median as a 
summary statistic might not be appropriate.
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The median (5th, 95th percentile) proportion of infected prem-
ises in the single-site outbreak scenarios [3.7% (0, 5.5%)] in our 
study was comparable to other studies (14, 16, 17) and the 1997–
1998 CSF outbreaks in the Netherlands (2%) (37). The multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios in our study resulted in a higher proportion of 
infected premises than the single-site outbreak scenarios.
The median proportion of depopulated premises (single-site 
outbreaks: 17.7%, multiple-site outbreaks: 26.3%) estimated in 
this study was higher than that of the 1997–1998 CSF outbreaks 
in the Netherlands (8%) (37). The difference might be explained 
by the incorporation of a bigger depopulation zone size in our 
study (3 km radius versus 1 km) (2). During a CSF outbreak, the 
availability of resources for vaccination and depopulation could 
greatly impact the success of the outbreak controls. In our study, 
80% of the iterations simulated for the single-site outbreak sce-
narios completed depopulation within 1 week. In the multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios, only 20% were depopulated within 1 week, 
and 30% took more than 30  days for complete depopulation. 
Only 38% of the simulated iterations in the single-site outbreak 
scenarios and 9% in the multiple-site outbreak scenarios were 
depopulated within 48 h, which is the time required to depopu-
late infected and contact premises as defined in the USDA CSF 
response plan (6). Vaccination, in contrast to depopulation, was 
estimated to be completed within 2 days in all iterations for both 
single-site and multiple-site outbreak scenarios. Therefore, vac-
cination of swine premises in large geographical areas might be 
used to accommodate limited depopulation capacities to control 
the spread of disease given the modeled vaccination capacity in 
Indiana. These findings provide guidance on optimizing pre-
paredness plans for CSF epidemics by implementing aggressive 
vaccination in outbreak controls (6).
The sensitivity analyses showed that the estimate of the num-
ber of infected premises was highly sensitive to a reduction in the 
direct contact rate and probability of CSF transmission due to 
direct contact, which indicates the importance of control strategies 
in reducing the epidemic size. For example, the implementation 
of movement restrictions would reduce the direct contact rate 
and strict biosecurity measures might help reduce the probability 
of CSF transmission after direct contact.
A caveat of the study is the lack of data on pig movement 
within Indiana, which might reduce the predictability of our risk 
metrics and the CSF spread model. We also used a higher degree 
of non-compliance in the CSF spread model for the multiple-site 
outbreak scenarios than the model for the single-site outbreak 
scenarios to account for larger geographical coverage. The differ-
ence in non-compliance rates would contribute to the differences 
in the outcome estimates observed between the single-site and 
multiple-site outbreak scenarios.
cOnclUsiOn
The risk metrics and disease spread model were developed 
using available evidence collected from empirical data and 
published studies to estimate CSF outbreak-related outcomes. 
The risk metrics were used to select the most likely CSF 
outbreak scenarios in Indiana for disease simulations. The 
study demonstrates that the characteristics of an outbreak, 
whether single-site and multiple-site, affect the estimates of 
CSF outbreak-related outcomes. Our results also suggest that 
the implementation of an aggressive vaccination regime could 
accommodate limited depopulation capacity in controlling 
the spread of CSF. The estimated numbers of infected prem-
ises were sensitive to the direct contact rate and probability 
of disease transmission due to direct contact, which indicates 
the importance of control strategies in reducing direct con-
tact. The outcome estimates generated from the study could 
assist swine producers in making informed decisions at the 
onset of a CSF outbreak to reduce potential economic losses. 
Our intent to develop the models using routinely collected 
data also allows other users to easily adapt and update the 
models to produce timely outcome estimates based on the 
characteristics of a CSF outbreak that they are facing.
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